作者将资产价格的现状比作一架在50000英尺高空飞行的飞机。不幸的是,我们无法找到这篇文章并提供链接。大意是市场估值正以异常高的高度飞行。虽然我们的市场飞机不能长期维持这样的高度,但也没有什么理由怀疑它将从天上掉下来。
许多投资者都在写关于目前极端的股票和债券估值的状态。令人惊讶的是很少有研究关注是什么让估值保持在这样的水平。流动性是我们资产泡沫的升力,值得仔细研究,以更好地评估市场的潜在飞行路径。
市场流动性
在投资领域,流动性是指金融资产买卖的便利性和成本。
例如美国国库券具有高度流动性。它们可以在一瞬间转手,而且通常是以当时的市场价格。
房地产则是流动性的另一面。例如,房屋或土地,可能需要几个月甚至几年的时间才能出售。卖方经常降低要价和/或谈判降低价格以影响销售。税收、费用、检查和冗长的结算日期进一步降低了这个过程。
流动性一词适用于个别资产,如上所述,但也可以描述一般的市场条件。
对流动性的想象
“市场就像一个有小门的大电影院”。纳西姆-塔勒布
人们通常源源不断地进入电影院。有些人提前到达,而另一些人则在电影开始时匆忙寻找座位。当离开时,有一个有序的出口,但需要更长的时间,因为每个人都在同一时间离开。用市场术语来说,我们可以把电影的正常进场和退场描述为普遍具有流动性。
如果有大量的人急于离开影院,退出就会变得无序或缺乏流动性。在2008年的金融危机中,许多证券的流动性很差。把它想象成火灾发生时拥挤的剧院。不仅很难退出,而且只有当别人愿意进入时,才能退出,或出售资产。
流动性在你最需要的时候是最不充裕的。
当价格在数月或数年内稳定和可预测地上涨,并且购买或出售投资的能力既透明又有效时,流动性的重要性通常被认为是理所当然的,并被忽视。我们在显示器上观察到的价格是我们可以卖出的价格。
有时流动性会消退,市场会迅速变得无序和动荡。我们可以卖出的价格可能与我们在电脑屏幕上看到的有很大的出入。这种环境的快速变化是由不确定性和焦虑造成的,与不断增加的波动性相联系。流动性是有价值的,在这种情况下,它要付出昂贵的代价。
有人说,银行总是愿意把钱借给不需要钱的人,而从不愿意把钱借给需要的人。流动性的概念非常相似;它总是在你最不需要它的时候最充裕,而在你最迫切需要它的时候却永远得不到。
一个资产或投资组合的流动性越强,就越容易在流动性事件中出售或管理,避免财务困境。因此,值得了解我们所持有的资产在流动性极好和极差时期的流动性特征。
为了了解为什么这一点如此重要,我们在下面研究了几个历史上可怕的非流动性时期。
黑色星期一
从1987年1月到8月25日,道琼斯工业平均指数(DJIA)上涨了40%。在这个急剧上升的高点,市场开始慢慢动摇。在8月底的高峰期到10月16日之间,道琼斯工业指数下跌了18%。
尽管放弃了一年中一半的收益,但很少有投资者注意到两个看似不重要的事件。首先,国会正在辩论对特定并购活动征税的立法。第二,一种新的投资管理工具,即投资组合保险,正在获得广泛的欢迎。与并购和投资组合保险有关的投资经理正在为市场增加流动性,并推动价格上涨,但很少有人考虑到这些投资者在市场走低时可能做出的反应。
对拟议立法的担忧导致了对并购活动进行投机的风险套利部门的抛售。作为回应,投资组合保险策略需要出售。前一年市场流动性的一个重要来源,突然间急需流动资金。
1987年10月19日,道琼斯工业平均指数在所谓的黑色星期一中下跌25%。 在短短的38个日历日里,市场放弃了之前八个月的100%的收益。
投资组合保险的陷阱往往被指责为创纪录的损失,但真正的罪魁祸首是流动性的突然丧失。
想想看就在 “黑色星期一 “之前的几个星期,市场似乎还充满了流动性。
索沃德资本
2007年7月,对冲基金Sowood Capital关闭了大门,因为他们突然解除了一个高杠杆的非流动性抵押贷款账目。尽管最终积累了16亿美元的基金损失,但这些投资被标准普尔定性为 “既不罕见也没有过度的风险”。
相反,Sowood的错误在于大量使用杠杆来购买资产。Sowood公司的故障是缺乏现金或流动资产,当借给他们的人要求他们缴纳保证金时,他们没有交纳。流动性储备本可以让他们提供抵押品,避免在一个不流动的市场上出售不流动的资产。
尽管Sowood的问题始于2007年春天,因为次贷市场开始松动,但几乎没有迹象表明他们采取了措施来管理流动性风险。事实上,有说法是Sowood增加了风险资产,并在虚假的信心中进一步减少了流动性。
最终,该基金的消亡发生在短暂的五个工作日内,以53%的损失和基金关闭而告终。最大的错误不一定是投资本身,而是没有考虑到流动性条件的变化。
2008年的金融危机
2008年中期,当伯南克还没有意识到经济衰退并淡化次贷市场的影响时,市场正变得越来越不稳定。2008年3月贝尔斯登/JP摩根救助后的市场稳定是一个短暂的平静表象。8月,当房利美和房地美(Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac)被迫承认其资产价值的恶化时,混乱就爆发了,这两个公司在高度杠杆化的基础上共持有1.2万亿美元的主要是高质量的流动抵押贷款。由于过度的杠杆作用和流动性的侵蚀,他们拼命地筹集资金来支撑他们的资本。这些钱大部分来自政府(纳税人),因为他们被监管机构置于保护状态。
其他抵押贷款相关债券的杠杆持有人,如世界上最大的银行和一些国际保险公司,也受到了类似的压力。从2008年8月到2009年3月,随着资产房地产价值的持续下跌,银行和公司违约的威胁越来越大。这些事件在银行和投资者之间造成了信任的减弱。几乎所有的资产市场都很难找到流动资金。
在危机期间,流动性漏洞屡见不鲜,甚至在流动性最好、风险最小的资产中也是如此。在一个独特的反常情况下,一些高质量的资产比低质量的资产价格下降得更多,因为投资者出售了任何有出价的东西。不确定性和流动性的丧失变得如此麻烦,以至于许多风险资产市场变得结构性封闭。卖方没有出价可以接受。那些陷入困境的人别无选择,只能积极地、不分青红皂白地出售质量较高的资产。去杠杆化和筹集现金的需要取代了其他一切。
极端的流动性
自金融危机以来,美联储和大多数其他中央银行家都采取了前所未有的措施,将利率保持在数个世纪的低点。此外,他们还通过量化宽松来加强他们的资产负债表,从而向市场提供直接和间接的过度流动性。
下图由Lohman Econometrics提供,显示了资产价值和中央银行资产之间的相关性。
美联储不仅提供大量的流动性,而且刺激投资者使用保证金债务。这个过程创造了更多的流动性。
下图显示了保证金债务如何有利于市场的上升,但取消保证金债务会导致市场的急剧下降。第二张图显示,目前使用的保证金债务在经济中的比例是60年来的最高水平。
在了解了这三个历史例子后,投资者应该问,如果保持我们市场飞机高飞的流动性升力消失了怎么办?更直接地说,如果美联储减少流动性,或者更糟糕的是,突然无法提供流动性怎么办?通货膨胀的爆发或美元的无序下跌是这样两个可能迅速发展的气囊。其他许多人就不那么明显了。
总结
当我们健康的时候,我们很少考虑我们呼吸的空气或喝的水,尽管它们对身体的正常运作有极大的重要性。同样地,投资者和媒体随意地抛出 “流动性 “这个词,但却没有掌握其重要性。
正如我们今天所看到的,宁静的极端情况被视为 “一切正常”。在现实中,它们是未来的警告。 我们提供的例子以及其他许多例子都强调,了解、跟踪和支持流动性的时间恰恰是在它最可用的时候,而其他人都认为它是理所当然的。
我们不是在预测市场的电影院即将发生火灾,也不是在预测我们的估值飞机会突然暴跌3万英尺。然而,我们提醒你这样的事件并不少见,鉴于目前的环境,最好是为这样的流动性事件制定一个计划。
The author compares the current situation of asset prices to an aircraft flying at an altitude of 50000 feet. Unfortunately, we were unable to find this article and provide a link. The main idea is that the market valuation is flying at an abnormally high altitude. Although our market aircraft can not maintain such an altitude for a long time, there is no reason to doubt that it will fall from the sky.
Many investors are writing about the current state of extreme stock and bond valuations. Surprisingly, few studies have focused on what keeps valuations at this level. Liquidity is the lift of our asset foam, which deserves careful study to better evaluate the potential flight path of the market.
Market liquidity
In the field of investment, liquidity refers to the convenience and cost of buying and selling financial assets.
For example, U.S. Treasury bills are highly liquid. They can change hands in a flash, and usually at the current market price.
Real estate is the other side of liquidity. For example, houses or land may take months or even years to sell. The seller often lowers the asking price and / or negotiates to lower the price to affect sales. Taxes, fees, inspections and lengthy settlement dates further reduce the process.
The term liquidity applies to individual assets, as described above, but can also describe general market conditions.
Imagination of fluidity
“The market is like a big cinema with small doors”. Nassim Taleb
People usually keep coming into the cinema. Some arrived early, while others rushed to find seats at the beginning of the film. When leaving, there is an orderly exit, but it takes longer because everyone leaves at the same time. In market terms, we can describe the normal entry and exit of films as generally liquid.
If a large number of people are eager to leave the cinema, the exit will become disorderly or lack of liquidity. In the financial crisis of 2008, many securities had poor liquidity. Think of it as a crowded theater when a fire breaks out. Not only is it difficult to exit, but only when others are willing to enter can they exit or sell their assets.
Liquidity is the least abundant when you need it most.
When prices rise steadily and predictably over months or years, and the ability to buy or sell investments is transparent and effective, the importance of liquidity is often taken for granted and ignored. The price we observe on the monitor is the price we can sell.
Sometimes liquidity will fade, and the market will quickly become disordered and turbulent. The price we can sell may be very different from what we see on the computer screen. This rapid change in the environment is caused by uncertainty and anxiety, which is associated with increasing volatility. Liquidity is valuable. In this case, it has to pay a high price.
Some people say that banks are always willing to lend money to people who don’t need it, but never willing to lend money to people who need it. The concept of liquidity is very similar; It is always most abundant when you need it the least, but never when you need it the most.
The stronger the liquidity of an asset or portfolio, the easier it is to sell or manage in a liquidity event and avoid financial distress. Therefore, it is worth knowing the liquidity characteristics of the assets we hold during periods of excellent and poor liquidity.
To understand why this is so important, we look below at several terrible periods of illiquidity in history.
Black Monday
From January to August 25, 1987, the Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA) rose by 40%. At this high point of sharp rise, the market began to shake slowly. Between the peak in late August and October 16, the Dow Jones Industrial Average fell 18%.
Despite giving up half of the profits in a year, few investors have noticed two seemingly unimportant events. First, Congress is debating legislation to tax specific M & A activities. Second, a new investment management tool, portfolio insurance, is gaining widespread popularity. Investment managers related to mergers and acquisitions and portfolio insurance are adding liquidity to the market and driving up prices, but few people consider how these investors might react when the market goes down.
Concerns about the proposed legislation led to a sell-off in the risk arbitrage sector, which speculated on mergers and acquisitions. In response, portfolio insurance strategies need to be sold. An important source of market liquidity in the previous year, it suddenly needed liquidity.
On October 19, 1987, the Dow Jones Industrial Average fell 25% in the so-called Black Monday. In just 38 calendar days, the market gave up 100% of the previous eight months.
The pitfalls of portfolio insurance are often blamed for record losses, but the real culprit is the sudden loss of liquidity.
Just think about the weeks before “Black Monday”, the market seemed to be full of liquidity.
Saward capital
In July 2007, the hedge fund sowood capital closed the door because they suddenly lifted a highly leveraged illiquid mortgage account. Although $1.6 billion of fund losses were eventually accumulated, these investments were characterized by S & P as “neither rare nor excessive risk”.
On the contrary, sowood’s mistake was to use a lot of leverage to buy assets. The trouble with sowood is that it lacks cash or liquid assets. When the lender asks them to pay a deposit, they do not pay it. Liquidity reserves could have allowed them to provide collateral to avoid selling illiquid assets in an illiquid market.
Although sowood’s problem began in the spring of 2007 when the subprime market began to loosen, there was little sign that they had taken measures to manage liquidity risk. In fact, it is said that sowood increased risk assets and further reduced liquidity in false confidence.
In the end, the demise of the fund occurred in a short five working days, ending with a 53% loss and the fund’s closure. The biggest mistake is not necessarily the investment itself, but the failure to consider the changes in liquidity conditions.
Financial crisis in 2008
In the middle of 2008, when Bernanke did not realize the economic recession and played down the impact of the subprime mortgage market, the market was becoming increasingly unstable. The market stability after the rescue of Bear Stearns / JPMorgan in March 2008 is a temporary calm. The chaos erupted in August when Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were forced to admit the deterioration of their asset values. The two companies held a total of $1.2 trillion of mainly high-quality liquid mortgages on a highly leveraged basis. Due to excessive leverage and erosion of liquidity, they desperately raise funds to support their capital. Most of this money comes from the government (taxpayers), because they are placed under the protection of regulators.
Other leveraged holders of mortgage-related bonds, such as the world’s largest banks and some international insurance companies, are under similar pressure. From August 2008 to March 2009, with the continuous decline in the value of real estate assets, the threat of default by banks and companies became greater and greater. These events have weakened trust between banks and investors. Liquidity is difficult to find in almost all asset markets.
During the crisis, liquidity loopholes were common, even in the most liquid and least risky assets. In a unique anomaly, the prices of some high-quality assets have fallen more than those of low-quality assets because investors have sold anything with an offer. Uncertainty and loss of liquidity have become so troublesome that many risk asset markets have become structurally closed. The seller has no acceptable bid. Those in trouble have no choice but to actively and indiscriminately sell higher quality assets. Deleveraging and the need to raise cash replaced everything else.
Extreme liquidity
Since the financial crisis, the Federal Reserve and most other central bankers have taken unprecedented measures to keep interest rates at centuries low levels. In addition, they also strengthen their balance sheets through quantitative easing, thereby providing direct and indirect excessive liquidity to the market.
The following figure, provided by Lohman economics, shows the correlation between asset value and central bank assets.
The fed not only provides a lot of liquidity, but also stimulates investors to use margin debt. This process creates more liquidity.
The figure below shows how margin debt is conducive to the rise of the market, but cancellation of margin debt will lead to a sharp decline in the market. The second chart shows that the proportion of margin debt currently used in the economy is the highest in 60 years.
After understanding these three historical examples, investors should ask, what if the liquidity lift that keeps our market aircraft flying high disappears? More directly, what if the Fed reduces liquidity, or worse, suddenly fails to provide liquidity? The outbreak of inflation or the disorderly decline of the dollar are such two airbags that may develop rapidly. Many others are less obvious.
summary
When we are healthy, we seldom consider the air we breathe or the water we drink, although they are of great importance to the normal functioning of the body. Similarly, investors and the media casually throw out the word “liquidity”, but fail to grasp its importance.
As we have seen today, the extreme situation of tranquility is regarded as “everything is normal”. In reality, they are warnings for the future. The examples we provide and many others emphasize that the time to understand, track and support liquidity is precisely when it is most available, and others take it for granted.
We are not predicting that there will be a fire in the cinema of the market, nor are we predicting that our valuation aircraft will suddenly plummet by 30000 feet. However, we remind you that such events are not uncommon. In view of the current environment, it is better to make a plan for such liquidity events.
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